Investments in Quality, Collective Reputation and Information Acquisition by Fontini, Fulvio et al.
Investments in Quality, Collective Reputation and
Information Acquisition
Fulvio Fontini, Katrin Millock, Michele Moretto
To cite this version:
Fulvio Fontini, Katrin Millock, Michele Moretto. Investments in Quality, Collective Reputation
and Information Acquisition. Documents de travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne
2013.44 - ISSN : 1955-611X. 2013. <halshs-00825782>
HAL Id: halshs-00825782
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00825782
Submitted on 24 May 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 Documents de Travail du 
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investments in Quality, Collective Reputation and 
Information Acquisition 
 
Fulvio FONTINI, Katrin MILLOCK, Michele MORETTO 
 
2013.44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 boulevard de L'Hôpital, 75647  Paris Cedex 13 
http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/bandeau-haut/documents-de-travail/ 
ISSN : 1955-611X 
 
Investments in Quality, Collective Reputation
and Information Acquisition
Fulvio Fontini∗ Katrin Millock † Michele Moretto∗
May 5, 2013
Abstract
In many cases consumers cannot observe firms’ investment in qual-
ity or safety, but have only beliefs on the average quality of the in-
dustry. In addition, the outcome of the collective investment game of
the firms may be stochastic since firms cannot control perfectly the
technology or external factors that may affect production. In such sit-
uations, when only consumers’ subjective perceptions of the industry
level of quality matters, the regulator may make information available
to firms or subsidize their information acquisition. Under what con-
ditions is it desirable to make information available? We show how
firms’ overall level of investment in quality depends upon the param-
eters of the quality accumulation process, the cost of investment and
the number of firms in the industry. We also show the potentially neg-
ative effects on the total level of quality from providing information
on consumers’ actual valuation.
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1 Introduction
In real investment problems it is often the case that firms’ investments in
improving product characteristics cannot be directly observed by consumers.
This is the case of so called credence goods (Darby and Karni, 1973), i.e.,
goods that consumers cannot discriminate ex ante by focusing on specific
elements when assessing their demand. In several cases credence goods are
characterized by collective production, in the sense that they are the result of
some production activity that depends on the behaviour of the entire indus-
try rather than on the investment undertaken by a single firm. This happens
when an individual tag or label cannot be attached to the production of a
given firm within the industry, when consumers’ perceptions of the good de-
pends more on the common behaviour of all firms in the industry rather than
the specific action or reputation of one of them, or when the production chain
itself is the result of the common effort of all participants in a given venture.
Consider, for instance, the investment in quality for the production of an
agricultural good that is perfectly homogeneous but can be characterized ac-
cording to a given localization or type of input supplied to the production
chain. Examples include the European protected geographical indication and
protected designation of origin labels, or state product labels in the US (such
as Washington apples, Idaho potatoes and Florida oranges). Or consider an
industry where reputation depends more on the intrinsic characteristics of
the production chain rather than on the individual behaviour, as is the case
of the safety reputation for some complex industrial production, e.g., the oil
and gas industry. Consumers’ concerns about oil extraction, for instance,
seem to be related more to the technology itself rather than the reputation
of a given supplier. Another example, yet different from the first two, might
be the case of an investment consortium set up to develop a research ac-
tivity. In all these cases, there is a collective supply of some input (effort,
feedstock, money, etc.) by all participants in the industry that generates
positive externalities for any firm in the industry. These externalities affect
2
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firms’ returns, depending on consumers’ ability to effectively evaluate and
integrate into their own demand the consequences of firms’ investment.
Investments in quality, effort, and research generate consequences that
are not ex ante observable, but only predictable. The impact that these in-
vestments have on firms’ return is stochastic for two main reasons. First, the
outcome of the investment can depend on the realization of some external
factor that is not under control of the single firm. Consider, for instance, the
case of the protected designation of origin labels, in which a systemic disease
or weather conditions might impact the quality of the feedstocks supplied
to the consortia that supervise the production chain. It might also be the
case of the random outcome of a research activity (that is ex ante uncertain
by definition) or the random occurrence of a systemic event that affects the
industry’s reputation as regards safety or reliability. One example was the
manner in which mad cow disease affected the entire market demand for
meat. The second source of uncertainty stems from the fact that the collec-
tive investments are beneficial for the firm only to the extent that consumers
realize the positive improvement in quality or safety and reward firms in a
given industry accordingly, thereby increasing demand for the product. The
objective of the paper is to study investments, such as those in collective
reputation, whose outcome is not directly observable, but only their con-
sequences ex post. In these cases what matters for consumers’ choice and
ultimately for firms’ returns is consumers’ perception of the collective ef-
fort, rather than its effective level. Consumers might experience goods with
a certain time lag, or be affected by subjective prejudices, expectations or
attitudes, that may be important at the time of the purchase. Therefore,
consumer attitudes can reinforce or weaken the consequences that the col-
lective effort effectively generates in terms of improving the quality of the
good, finding a new good or process, and improving firms’ reputation or re-
liability. Hence, firms’ investments are plagued not only with an objective
3
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(systemic) uncertainty about the result of their effort, but also with a subjec-
tive one, depending on consumers’ attitudes and perceptions. Firms who are
characterized by a positive (negative) perception by consumers are rewarded
(penalized) in terms of an increase (reduction) of their demand.
Typically, firms might send signals to consumers through advertising and
labelling, or might try to build on their reputation in order to improve the
consumers’ perception. We do not follow these approaches here, as they
have already been thoroughly explored in the literature (see the survey by
Dranove and Jin, 2010). On the contrary, we are interested in evaluating to
what extent relieving firms’ uncertainty can be beneficial for both the firms
themselves and the society as a whole. For this, we assume that the uncer-
tainty about consumers’ valuation of quality can be resolved by paying a fee
to run a market research survey, for instance. We investigate to what extent
this possibility affects firms’ value, their choice of acquiring the information,
as well as overall quality accumulation over time. This latter point is mo-
tivated by the consideration that the type of investments we analyze here
often implies positive externalities not just for the industry involved, but for
society. It may therefore be desirable to increase investment in product qual-
ity, research, firms’ safety or reliability, regardless of the benefit for a given
firm or the industry. However, when the investment generates a collective
good for the firms that operate in the industry, their individual investment
decision problem is quite complex. On the one hand, each firm has to take
into account the strategic behaviour of all other firms when deciding on how
much to invest in the production of the collective good. On the other hand,
there exists a twofold uncertainty that affects its possibility to recoup its
expenses through an increase in demand and profits. Such an investment
problem is the target of our study. As mentioned, we tackle it from both the
standpoint of firms’ value, as well as from quality accumulation. In order to
do so, we define the firms’ investment problem and analyze a dynamic in-
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vestment game in a collective good that has a positive externality. From now
onward, for the sake of simplicity, we will refer to such a good as “quality”.
We set up a model in which the total quality that results from the collective
investment problem is stochastic. Quality affects firms’ profits by increas-
ing individual demand but the amount of such an increase is also random,
since it depends on consumers’ perception of the quality level. We consider
the possibility for the firms of paying a fee to eliminate the latter source of
uncertainty, for instance through paying a fee to acquire information on con-
sumers’ valuation of the aggregate quality from a market research company.
We study if and how much such a possibility is going to affect firms’ quality
investment decisions, firm value and ultimately the overall level of quality
generated. Finally, to focus on the probability of quality adoption by firms
from a public perspective, we evaluate to what extent facilitating the acqui-
sition of such information can be beneficial for speeding up the process of
quality creation. The paper is structured as follows. After the introduction,
the next Section discusses the related literature. The model is introduced
in Section 2. Section 3 characterizes the solution to the firms’ quality in-
vestment game without information acquisition, whereas Section 4 solves the
investment decision problem with information acquisition. In Section 5 we
consider the quality accumulation problem, and investigate whether it is ex
ante optimal for an external body, who can allow or restrain firms to acquire
information, to do so when information acquisition either is costly or cost-
less. Conclusions and indications of future research follow. All proofs are
presented in the Appendix.
1.1 Discussion of the related literature
Our analysis draws on three different strands of the literature: the litera-
ture on quality and collective reputation, investment theory under stochastic
production and the literature on regulation through information disclosure.
Tirole (1996) first investigated collective reputation in the context of worker
5
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matching. It has since been applied in many fields, notably trade in agricul-
tural commodities and other products that are not easily distinguishable ex
ante (Winfree and McCluskey, 2005; McQuade et al., 2010), but always in
a deterministic framework. Recent work on stochastic quality, on the other
hand, normally assumes that a firm can signal the quality of its product (high
or low) such that its own reputation matters, not the collective reputation.
In Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2011) reputation is defined as consumers’ be-
lief that the product quality is high. Dilme (2011) and Bohren (2011) studies
the cumulative effect of past investments on current quality in a stochastic
game, but also here, in a game between one firm and multiple consumers.
We extend the analysis of a firm’s investment decision in quality and the
dynamics of the collective reputation of firms by analyzing a dynamic game
with stochastic quality. The model we develop extends the existing anal-
ysis by allowing the quality level to be stochastic both in the level of the
investment and in the impact that quality has on firms’ demand.1 We share
with Claude and Zaccour (2009) the specification of how reputation shifts
aggregate demand and the collective build-up of a stock of quality. But, also
here, we depart in our assumption of the stochastic nature of quality.
It is natural to interpret quality as environmental quality or safety, or
other credence good characteristics. Whereas there is little modeling on the
consequences of firms’ information acquisition, some theoretical modeling
has been done of information disclosure on safety or environmental quality.
Kennedy et al. (1994) analyze the conditions under which information disclo-
sure of a consumption externality can be welfare-enhancing when consumers
form expectations of the aggregate environmental damage. Their model con-
centrates on the consumer’s choice only and does not investigate the con-
sequences of information acquisition on the firm. Petrakis et al. (2005)
extend the analysis of information disclosure as a policy option to include
1Static analyses by Fleckinger, 2007, and McQuade et al., 2010, focus on the impact of
market structure and of regulation, such as minimum quality standards.
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also an environmental externality and consideration of the market structure
and show how the combination of environmental taxes and information dis-
closure leads to higher welfare than either instrument on its own. Sartzetakis
et al. (2012) analyze the build-up of the information available to consumers
over time and how it interacts with the setting of an optimal environmental
tax. The existing literature thus focuses on consumers’ use of information
disclosure programmes, whereas the focus of the current article is the impact
of information acquisition on firms’ investment in quality.
Our approach is also related, at least from a theoretical point of view,
to the models in the literature on R&D collaboration (based on the semi-
nal models of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988, and Kamien et al., 1992).
Indeed, the model that we develop here on the investment in collective rep-
utation can describe well an R&D problem where the collective good might
be, for instance, the overall level of financial commitment of the participants
to a research consortium. In this case, the problem of the subjective per-
ception of consumers that might reduce or increase the impact that research
has on firms’ demand is indeed the case of a trial that allows firms to realize
the market potential of a given research project. From this point of view,
we extend the literature by explicitly considering the free rider problem in
a dynamic stochastic framework, i.e., analyzing a dynamic investment game
under uncertainty.2
Methodologically, the paper that is the most closely related to ours is
Wirl (2008) who studies a stochastic dynamic game among firms that create
a stock externality that is subject to uncertainty over time. By comparison
to that model we share the context of a dynamic game among firms but
we develop the model to include aspects of information availability that are
absent in such dynamic games. In particular, we introduce uncertainty also
on consumers’ perceptions on the quality of the good and evaluate the value
2Recent dynamic models of positive spillovers from R&D models are all deterministic
to our knowledge (for example Hinloopen et al., 2011).
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to firms of acquiring that information.
2 The model
Consider an industry composed of n risk-neutral identical firms that produce
a good whose market price is affected by the level of reputation R of the
industry as a whole. That is, the level of R determines the location of the
inverse demand curve, as in Winfree and McCluskey (2005) and Claude and
Zaccour (2009). We further assume that, although the firms may invest in
product quality to increase their collective level of reputation, they are unable
to trace exactly how consumers convert product quality into reputation but
can only form expectations on that.
We make the following assumptions about the industry:
Assumption 1 Each firm produces one unit of output to be sold in a market
where the inverse demand function depends positively on the level of
reputation of the whole industry. We adopt a linear functional as:
p(R) = a+R (1)
where a > 0 is an index that can be viewed as the relative strength of
the market demand. We thus deliberatively abstract from firms’ other
strategic interactions, such as the quantity choice, in order to focus the
analysis on the provision of quality as a collective good problem.
Assumption 2 Even if consumers are willing to pay a higher price for the
product produced by firms with higher reputation for quality, firms
are unable to trace exactly how much their investment contributes to
increase reputation. This relation is linear for simplicity:
R = (1 + θ)Q (2)
8
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where Q is the stock of quality and θ is a stochastic variable with
density f(θ), θ ∈ [−1,+1] and E(θ) = 0.3 We believe there is no
reason to suppose ex ante that consumers have any positive or negative
bias towards reputation, therefore we assume that θ is symmetrically
distributed around its mean.
Substituting (2) in (1) we get: p(Q, θ) = a + (1 + θ)Q. Since θ must be
understood to represent consumers’ specific perception of the product quality,
the main issue is the information that the firms possess. In this respect we
add the following assumption:
Assumption 3 Firms have common knowledge and observe perfectly the
evolution of Q, but they do not know the realization of θ. Furthermore,
although firms can observe total quality, we assume that they cannot
infer θ from observing the price.
Assuming that firms cannot infer θ from observing the past relations of
p and Q, is tantamount to assume that either (i) they must have some form
of limited recall or knowledge, i.e., a limited memory of past occurrences or
(ii) the term a has a stochastic component that cannot be observed by the
firms.4
Assumption 4 Each firm may improve the level of reputation of the indus-
try as a whole by investing each time an amount ki, i = 1, 2...n, in the
3The support of θ can be [θ−, θ¯] without affecting the results. But as seen from Equation
(2), as long as Q > 0, R ≥ 0 if and only if θ− ≥ −1.
4For instance, we could assume, as in Claude and Zaccour (2009), a simple linear inverse
demand curve:
p = A+R− CX
where p is the output price per unit, X is the total output , A is an exogenous shock
to demand and C is a non-negative constant representing the slope of the linear demand
function. Setting a = A− CX we would obtain the expression (1) in the text.
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quality of the product. We assume that the stock of quality (Q) evolves
over time according to the following stochastic differential equation:
dQ = g
(
n∑
i=1
ki
)
Qdt+ σQdz, Q0 = Q (3)
where dz are identically and independently distributed according to a
normal distribution with mean zero and variance dt. There are several
reasons why the level of product quality is stochastic: uncertainty over
the adopted technology, external occurrences (for instance weather-
related events), and similar unmanageable causes. Assuming a stochas-
tic evolution of quality over time is rather standard and the assumption
of a Brownian motion is shared by several analyses of a single firm’s
investment problem (e.g., Faingold and Sannikov, 2011, Bohren, 2011).
Since we aim at analyzing the collective reputation of a set of firms,
the drift term g (
∑n
i=1 ki) is a function of the aggregate level of invest-
ment in quality at time t, with g′ (
∑n
i=1 ki) > 0 and g (0) = 0, while
the instantaneous variance σ is constant. For the rest of the paper
we assume that g (
∑n
i=1 ki) = α(
∑n
i=1 ki/n), with α ∈ [0, 1]. It seems
reasonable to assume that only a fraction of new investment in quality
accumulates over time. The assumption on average quality is used also
in a deterministic framework in Winfree and McCluskey (2005) and
in McQuade et al. (2010) who use a quantity-weighted average of the
qualities sold by the firms. Indeed, consumers only have an idea of
average quality since they cannot distinguish individual contributions
to quality. This assumption is supported by the empirical work by
Landon and Smith (1997, 1998). Furthermore, for sake of simplicity,
equation (3) is further simplified by assuming that each firm invests at
a fixed level, i.e., ki ∈ {0, 1} for all i.
Assumption 5 The investment in quality is totally irreversible. The firms
may improve product quality by adopting a new technology, devoting
10
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resources to acquire a new production process or simply investing in
research. These investment activities are considered to be product-
specific and sunk. Therefore, at each point in time the firm has the
choice (strategy) to make a sunk investment in quality or not at cost
c > 0. Furthermore, decay is assumed to be zero.5
The analysis is conducted using feedback stationary Markov strategies:
ki = Ψi(Q), for i = 1, 2...n. This implies that at time t the firms’ actions
depend only on the current state of information, i.e. the accumulated stock
of quality. In addition the symmetry implies that ki = Ψ(Q) for all i and the
best reply to Ψ−i is a Nash equilibrium.6
3 Incomplete information with no information
acquisition
If information on θ cannot be acquired neither ex-ante nor ex post, the firm
makes a decision which is based on the expected value of θ. Obviously, with-
out information there is no reason to believe that either a positive or negative
bias exists, and therefore its expected value is set equal to zero. Assuming
profit maximizing behaviour, each firm chooses the level of investment in
quality that maximizes the expected present value of its stream of profits
over time, subject to the state equation (3). If we denote the discount rate
5In order to make the model more realistic, we could also introduce quality depreciation,
for instance, by assuming that quality lifetime follows a Poisson process. This would mean
that, over any short period dt, there would be a given probability that Q got reduced or
even completely cancelled. Since the effect of depreciation would be making irreversibility
weaker, i.e., investment in quality would not be eternal, none of the results of the paper
would be affected by such an assumption.
6Since the strategy equation ki = Ψ(Q) is derived by the firm’s non-cooperative in-
tertemporal optimization (see Section 3 below), each firm behaves optimally for all values
of Q regardless of whether this stock was on or off the equilibrium path (Basar and Olsder,
1995).
11
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by r (r > α), the firm’s objective is:
V (Q) = max
ki∈{0,1}
E0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtp(Qt; 0)dt−
∑
m
e−rTmcki
]
(4)
s.t. dQt ≥ 0 and (3) for all t ≥ 0
where θ is substituted by E(θ) = 0, c is the unit cost of quality, Tm indicates
the time periods at which the firm invests and m is a counter indicating the
number of times the firm invests.
The sufficient condition for a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium is
given by the Bellman equation for the firm’s non-cooperative intertemporal
optimization:
rVi = max
ki∈{0,1}
[
1
2
σ2Q2V ′′i + g
(
ki +
n∑
j 6=i
kj
)
QV ′i + p(Q; 0)− cki
]
for i = 1, 2...n
(5)
where V ′i and V ′′i stand for the first and second derivatives with respect to
Q respectively. Recall that because of the binary action space and firms’
homogeneity assumption, Vi = V for all i.
Standard arguments lead to a solution for (5) taking the following form
(see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, and Appendix A):
V (Q; 0) =
{
V0(Q; 0) for Q < Qˆ
V1(Q; 0) for Q > Qˆ
where V0(Q; 0) and V1(Q; 0) are the firm’s value when it is not investing and
when it is investing in quality respectively, and Qˆ is the stock of quality that
triggers the investment. If firms find themselves in a range of quality such
that Q < Qˆ, they would not invest in quality, i.e., would choose k = 0.
This simply means that the overall stock of quality would evolve over time
following a purely stochastic path with no drift term (see Equation (3)). If,
on the contrary, the overall level of quality was such that Q > Qˆ, firms would
12
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find it optimal to invest, i.e., k = 1. Recall that the stochastic nature of Q
is such that firms change their strategy whenever Q crosses Qˆ. This might
happen several times. In other words, even if firms were in a region where
they would find it optimal to invest in quality, it might happen that at a
certain point in time Q falls below Qˆ, which implies that firms would stop
investing (and vice versa).
Assuming that Qˆ exists, substituting the two strategies into the Bellman
equation (5) reduces to:
rV0 =
1
2
σ2Q2V ′′0 + p(Q; 0) for Q < Qˆ (6)
and
rV1 =
1
2
σ2Q2V ′′1 + g (n)QV
′
1 + p(Q; θ)− c for Q > Qˆ (7)
Provided that r > g (n), solving the problem [6-7] yields the following:
Proposition 1 In the quality investment game, the following holds:
1) The investment rule is:
Qˆ =
(β1 − γ2) rnα − γ2β1
(β1 − γ2)− β1(γ2 − 1) αr−α
c > 0 (8)
2) The value of the firm is:
V (Q; 0) =
{
A0Q
β1 + a+Q
r
for Q < Qˆ
B1Q
γ2 + a
r
+ Q
r−α − cr for Q > Qˆ
(9)
where:
A0 =
[
nc
α
− Qˆ
r
]
Qˆ−β1
β1
and B1 =
[
nc
α
− Qˆ
r − α
]
Qˆ−γ2
γ2
(10)
13
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and: β1 = 12 +
√
(1
2
)2 + 2r
σ2
> 1, γ2 = (12 − ασ2 )−
√
(1
2
− α
σ2
)2 + 2r
σ2
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix A
In (9), in the range where Q > Qˆ, the term a
r
+ Q
r−α − cr is the present
value of selling the output when each firm commits to invest forever, while
B1Q
γ2 is the value of the option to suspend investment in the future. On
the contrary, in the range where Q < Qˆ, the term a+Q
r
indicates the present
value of selling the output when each firm chooses not to invest in quality,
while A0Qβ1 is the option value of the investment in quality. This latter
term represents the benefits each firm expects to obtain by the rivals’ future
investment in quality. Because the existence of negative spillover due to
other firms’ possible free riding strategies, such benefits need not necessarily
be positive. In particular, inspecting the expression for A0 in Equation (10),
we note that, as long as Qˆ > 0, the following is true:
If
Qˆ
n
>
rc
α
then A0 < 0 and B1 > 0
while
If
Qˆ
n
<
(r − α)c
α
then A0 > 0 and B1 < 0
In the quality investment game that firms are playing the usual prisoners’
dilemma trade-off applies. On the one hand, investing in quality is positive
since it increases revenues, but on the other hand each firm is tempted to free
ride on the others, given the positive industry spillovers. When A0 < 0, each
player, expecting the free-riding behavior of the other firms, anticipates the
rivals’ moves choosing not to undertake its own investment. This generates a
war of attrition game that is harmful for product quality as well as for each
player. In fact, the result is the opposite of the one obtained by Wirl (2008) in
his study of a dynamic game among firms contributing to the same aggregate
externality.7 Here, free riding makes firms wait longer before investing since
7Proposition 6, p. 108 in Wirl (2008).
14
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.44
an increase in n only decreases aggregate quality. On the contrary, if A0 > 0,
the positive impact of the investments more than compensates the negative
effect of the free-rider problem, inducing a positive value for the investment
option.
Similarly, in the range of values for which the free-rider problem domi-
nates the positive spillover from investment, the option to suspend invest-
ment adds value to firms’ choice even if the firm is not investing, given that
it is beneficial to keep alive the possibility of stopping investments: B1 > 0.
Symmetrically, the option to stop investing when firms find it beneficial to
invest, that is, when the spillovers dominate the free-rider problem, reduces
the firms’ investment value: B1 < 0.
4 Investment in information acquisition
Now consider the case when θ is not known, but the firms are able to ob-
tain information on the true value of θ by paying (altogether) a fixed fee
Φ. Depending on the market condition, this can be done by the firm before
undertaking the investment decision or after having started to invest. Given
that we intend to focus on the choice to acquire information per se, and do
not want to mix the investment choice with other possible gaming behav-
ior, we assume that no free-riding is possible in the information acquisition
choice. A sufficient condition might be, for instance, that the fee for acquir-
ing information has a threshold Φ∗ such that Φn−1
n
< Φ∗. In such a case
there would be information acquisition only when all firms decide to pay the
individual fee Φ
n
.
Working backward, we first derive the optimal strategy under full infor-
mation and then we consider the option value to acquire the information on
θ.
15
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4.1 Costless information acquisition
When information acquisition is costless, we are in a case of full information,
i.e., firms can acquire the information on θ without paying any cost. In such
a setting, Equation (4) becomes:
V (Q; θ) = max
ki∈{0,1}
E0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtp(Qt; θ)dt−
∑
m
e−rTmcki
]
for i = 1, 2...n
s.t. dQt ≥ 0 and (3) for all t ≥ 0 (11)
From which it is easy to prove that:
Proposition 2 Under full information,
1) The optimal trigger is:
Q˜ =
Qˆ
(1 + θ)
(12)
2) and the value of the firm becomes:
V (Q; θ) =
{
A˜0Q
β1 + a+(1+θ)Q
r
for Q < Q˜
B˜1Q
γ2 + a
r
+ (1+θ)Q
r−α − cr for Q > Q˜
(13)
where:
A˜0 =
[
nc
α
− Q˜
r
]
Q˜−β1
β1
and B˜1 =
[
nc
α
− Q˜
r − α
]
Q˜−γ2
γ2
(14)
Proof. Straightforward from Appendix A
Note that the firms’ value function described above (13) maintains the
same structure and characteristics of the case discussed above. In particular,
16
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the option value of investing (A˜0) and of halting investment (B˜1) can be
negative or positive, according to the parameters of the game. In addition,
by (12), it is immediate to show that:
Q˜ ≥ Qˆ for θ ∈ [−1, 0]
Q˜ < Qˆ for θ ∈ (0,+1]
This implies that the impact of information on the investment choice is
not linear. In particular, information on θ may foster investment in quality
compared to the case when there is no information acquisition, i.e., Q˜ < Qˆ, if
the consumers’ uncertainty parameter is such that, once revealed, it shows a
positive bias of consumers’ quality perception, i.e., if θ > 0. On the contrary,
information disclosure might slow down the investment in quality, i.e., Q˜ >
Qˆ, if consumers maintain a negative perception of firms’ investments, i.e.,
if θ < 0. Obviously, it is never optimal to invest in quality if the quality
perception by consumers is the worst possible one, θ → −1 (i.e. A˜0 = 0
and Q˜ = ∞). Figure 1 describes the difference in terms of the stock of
quality that triggers the investment in quality with information compared
to the case when there is no information acquisition, as a function of the
uncertainty parameter θ.
We can see in Figure 1 that the trigger of the investment in the full
information case coincides with the one for the no information case only if
consumers have no bias (either positive or negative) in their perception of
quality, i.e., θ = 0. On the contrary, a positive (negative) bias induces firms to
invest earlier (later), as expected. The trigger has a lower boundary when the
parameter θ is positive, due to the lowest boundary of any investment trigger,
namely Qˆ
2
. Given the structure of the game, when the accumulated quality
level is low (below Qˆ
2
), the positive spillover of the quality is so low that firms
find it optimal not to invest in quality even if they knew that consumers
have the highest possible perception of their investment. On the contrary, a
17
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Figure 1: Q˜ as a function of θ
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negative bias in consumer perceptions delays the investment decision even if
the aggregate quality level is extremely high. In the extreme case, for a fully
negative bias firms would never invest. In fact, it is as if firms’ investment
decisions were penalized more by a negative perception of their quality level
by consumers than by a positive one, which might induce a more cautious
behaviour by firms.
4.2 Costly information acquisition
Let us consider now the case in which firms can obtain information on θ by
paying a fee Φ
n
. We assume that firms can choose when to take that decision.
A priori, it may occur either before or after they have decided on their own
to invest in quality. This implies that there are two decisions that have to
be taken and consequently two triggers: one is the trigger of the investment
choice without knowing θ and the other one is the trigger of the information
acquisition choice. The first is still Qˆ and call the second QI . We consider
now the latter.
If we denote by Eθ [V (Q; θ)] − V (Q; 0) the ex-ante value of information,
the problem can be managed as suggested by Murto (2004):
I(Q) = max
T
E0
[(
Eθ [V (Q; θ)]− V (Q; 0)− Φ
n
)
e−rT
]
, (15)
where I(Q) indicates the option value that each firm holds to acquire infor-
mation on θ and T the optimal learning time, defined as:
T (Q) = inf(t ≥ 0 | Eθ [V (QI ; θ)]− V (QI ; 0) = Φ
n
+ I(QI)). (16)
The optimal learning time is thus given by the very moment at which
the stock QI reaches a specific level, i.e., as soon as the value of information
exactly outweighs the opportunity cost to acquire it, where the latter consists
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of the cost of information Φ
n
plus the value of the option to wait.8
In particular, since (12) is monotonic, we are able to write:
Eθ [V (Q; θ)] =
∫ θ˜(Q)
−1
V0(Q; θ)f(θ)dθ +
∫ +1
θ˜(Q)
V1(Q; θ)f(θ)dθ (17)
where θ˜(Q) = Qˆ
Q
− 1 ∈ [0,∞).9 Equation (17) shows that, for any given Q,
the ex-ante value is formed by two terms. The first integral indicates the
firm’s value when the revealed value of θ is so low that it is not optimal to
invest in quality, while the second integral reflects the case where θ is found
sufficiently high to induce the firm to invest in quality. Using (17), we are
able to write the ex-ante value of information on θ as:
Eθ [V (Q; θ)]− V (Q; 0) =
∫ θ˜(Q)
−1 V0(Q; θ)f(θ)dθ +
∫ +1
θ˜(Q)
V1(Q; θ)f(θ)dθ − V1(Q; 0) Qˆ < Q <∞∫ θ˜(Q)
−1 V0(Q; θ)f(θ)dθ +
∫ +1
θ˜(Q)
V1(Q; θ)f(θ)dθ − V0(Q; 0) Qˆ2 < Q < Qˆ∫ +1
−1 V0(Q; θ)f(θ)dθ − V0(Q; 0) for Q < Qˆ2
(18)
Let us turn now to the solution of (15). Assuming that there exists a value
QI beyond which each firm decides to coordinate spending on θ, we need to
distinguish between the case where QI is below Qˆ from the case where QI is
above Qˆ. In words, starting from Q < Qˆ
2
, if the stock of quality hits for the
8Note that both I(Q) and T (Q) are functions of Q only, since Eθ [V (Q; θ)] is taken
over the distribution of θ.
9To be precise, since dQ˜(θ)dθ < 0 for all θ ∈ [−1,+1], by inverting (12) we get:
θ˜(Q) =

−1 when Q˜(−1) =∞
Qˆ
Q − 1 for Qˆ2 < Q <∞
+1 Q ≤ Q˜(+1) = Qˆ2
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first time QI < Qˆ the firm maximizes the value of information (18) while it
is not investing in quality. On the contrary, if the optimal trigger lies above
Qˆ then the firm maximizes the value of acquiring θ having first decided to
already invest in quality. This implies that in the first case the solution of
(15) must solve the following Bellman equation:
rI =
1
2
σ2Q2I ′′ for Q < QI < Qˆ (19)
while in the second case the Bellman equation becomes:
rI =
1
2
σ2Q2I ′′ + αQI ′ for Qˆ < Q < QI (20)
where I ′ and I ′′ stand for the first and second derivatives with respect to Q
respectively.
From which we can prove:
Proposition 3 1) If Qˆ
2
< Q < Qˆ, provided that QI < Qˆ, the optimal trigger
is given by:
αQI
r(r − α)
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
(1 + θ)f(θ)dθ =
β1
β1 − 1
[
Φ
n
+
c
r
[
1− F (θ˜(QI))
]]
(21)
−β1 − γ2
β1 − 1
{∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
B˜1(θ)Q
γ2
I f(θ)dθ
}
2) If Qˆ < Q <∞, provided that QI > Qˆ, the optimal trigger is given by:
αQI
r(r − α)
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
(1 + θ)f(θ)dθ =
αQI
r(r − α) +
(
γ1
γ1 − 1
)[
Φ
n
− c
r
F (θ˜(QI))
]
(22)
+
(
β1 − γ1
γ1 − 1
)∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
[
A˜0(θ)Q
β1
I
]
f(θ)dθ
−
(
γ1 − γ2
γ1 − 1
)[∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
B˜1(θ)Q
γ2
I f(θ)dθ − Bˆ1Qγ2I
]
21
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.44
3) If Q < Qˆ
2
or Q→∞ it will never be optimal for the firms to acquire
information on θ.
Proof. See Appendix B
When the current value of quality is small, the first part of Proposition 3
says that it is worth to acquire information about the true value of θ, on an
individual basis, when the expected present value of the extra revenues from
the investment in quality covers the opportunity cost due to the sunkness of
Φ, the investment cost c and the value of the option to stop investing if the
market conditions turn down.
Conversely, the second part of Proposition 3 says that when Q is high
enough and the firm is already investing in quality, it is worth to acquire
information on θ only if the expected present value of the extra revenues,
having done so, covers the extra revenues that the firm is already getting
without information (i.e. αQI
r(r−α) =
QI
r−α − QIr ), plus the opportunity cost to
acquire the information, plus the expected opportunity cost to have to wait
before investing in the case of bad news about θ (positive, since β1 > γ1), and
finally minus the difference between the expected option value to abandon
the investment that the firm would have acquiring the information and the
one that it has without knowing θ. Note that, in this case, the investment
cost c enters negatively. This is simply due to the fact that since the firm is
investing in quality stopping doing it is seen as a benefit. The value of QI
that satisfies condition (21) ((22)) and also satisfies QI < Qˆ (QI > Qˆ) can
be found numerically.10
Finally, by direct inspection of (21) and (22), it easy to show that if the
aggregate level of quality is too low or extremely high (going to infinity) it
is never optimal to learn θ. In fact for QI → Qˆ2 only good news about θ may
induce the firm to acquire information, i.e., θ˜(QI)→ +1, and Equation (21)
10Note that the non-linearity of (21) and (22) does not guarantee that the solution, if
it exists, is unique. In the case of multiple solutions, the trigger would be the smaller QI
greater than Q.
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will never be satisfied. On the other hand, for QI → ∞, the option to stop
investing becomes negligible and Q is so high that the option to reconsider
investment in the face of bad news on θ disappears (i.e. θ˜(QI) → −1). The
third part of Proposition 3 thus defines the ranges of aggregate quality where
it is never optimal to invest in information acquisition.
5 The information disclosure choice
The analysis studied the firms’ optimal choice of investing in quality. Never-
theless, the analysis provides some indications on whether it would be worth-
while for an external body to acquire information on consumers’ valuation
of aggregate quality and disclose it to firms. A single firm cannot disclose
such information, since that would be considered cheap talk, and a natural
benchmark would be a consortium of the industry that could credibly certify
the veracity of the information. We will discuss the case of such a "regula-
tor" aiming at maximizing the probability that the firms invest in quality.
An example of such a situation might be the case of those consortia that are
formed as public entities, characterized by a compulsory membership and
that have as a mandate (at least formally), to guarantee members’ quality
on behalf of public interest, as it is the case, for instance, of professional
associations or bodies.
We assume therefore that such a consortium, or body, aims at maximizing
the probability of quality adoption by its members. Let P˜
(
Q˜(θ);Q
)
and
Pˆ
(
Qˆ;Q
)
be the probabilities of investing when θ is revealed and when it
is unknown, respectively. In other words, starting at Q in the interior of
the range (0, Q˜(θ)] and (0, Qˆ], P˜ and Pˆ indicate the probability that the
stock of quality reaches the triggers Q˜(θ) and Qˆ, respectively. Obviously,
Pˆ
(
Qˆ;Q
)
< 1 when Q < Qˆ and Pˆ
(
Qˆ;Q
)
= 1 for Q ≥ Qˆ.
We consider two possible cases: 1) neither the consortium nor the firms
can learn about consumer perceptions, 2) the consortium does not know θ
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but can acquire information on consumer perceptions at no cost, and has
to decide ex ante whether it is worthwhile to do so assuming that once it
obtains the information all members can see it, i.e., the firms will know θ.11
Note that in case 1), when neither the consortium nor the firms can learn
about consumer perceptions, θ cannot be revealed and the two probabilities
coincide. In such a case information is irrelevant. The only choice the con-
sortium can make, should it be able to do so, is to induce firms to invest
earlier (lower the trigger for investment) by restricting the number of mem-
bers, or in the case of agricultural goods, delimit the geographic area of the
protected origin label in order to decrease the number of firms concerned.
These options follow directly from the comparative statics on the investment
trigger (8):
∂Qˆ
∂c
> 0,
∂Qˆ
∂n
> 0,
∂Qˆ
∂a
= 0
As expected, the higher the investment cost, the higher the investment trig-
ger and thus, mutatis mutandis, the higher is the critical level of quality
below which firms find it optimal not to invest. Similarly, the number of
firms has a negative impact on the investment game, inducing a higher trig-
ger level of quality to invest. The reason is that an increase in the number
of firms, coupled with the possible free riding behavior, can only reduce the
average quality of the investment and this lowers the positive impact that the
investment decision has on each firm’s value. In other words, the marginal
damage of the free-riding problem more than compensates the positive qual-
ity spillover, inducing firms to delay the investment in quality.
Any action that decreases the number of firms would thus decrease the
trigger level for investment in quality and hence maximize aggregate quality,
as would a subsidy to the firm’s cost of investing in quality (c). Two factors
11Note however that we do not allow firms knowing ex ante that the consortium has
the possibility to release such information - in other words, no signalling game is allowed
between the consortium and the firms.
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explain this straightforward result: average quality is what matters for con-
sumer perceptions, so a higher number of firms decreases average quality, all
else equal, and in addition, the more numerous are firms, the worse is the
free-riding problem in the dynamic game.
In case 2), the consortium may acquire the information and reveal it to
the firms. It has to decide the optimal time to do so, i.e., whether it is
best acquiring the information right away and revealing it to all members, or
waiting for firms to invest in quality by themselves and then disclosing the
information on θ. Hence, the consortium’s problem consists of identifying
the stock Q that maximizes the following difference:
∆(P (Q)) =

∫ θ˜(Q)
−1 P˜
(
Q˜(θ);Q
)
f(θ)dθ +
∫ +1
θ˜(Q)
1f(θ)dθ − Pˆ
(
Qˆ;Q
)
for Q < Qˆ∫ θ˜(Q)
−1 P˜
(
Q˜(θ);Q
)
f(θ)dθ +
∫ +1
θ˜(Q)
1f(θ)dθ − 1 for Q ≥ Qˆ
(23)
We can claim the following
Proposition 4 It is never (strictly) optimal to disclose the information on
θ. It is indifferent to do so only when Q = Qˆ
2
.
Proof. See Appendix C
The above proposition clearly shows that for the consortium it is never
optimal to acquire and disclose the information on consumers’ perception
even if it were costless do do so. In fact, it is always strictly worse, in the
sense that the probability of investing in quality, once the information is
revealed, is lower for all possible levels of accumulated quality, with just one
specific exception, namely, that exact level of quality for which it would be
indifferent to reveal the information since it would have no impact on the
probability of an early adoption of quality. The rationale of such a result is
the following. When firms are already investing in quality, there is no point
in revealing information that might just do harm, in the sense of inducing
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firm to stop investing should they come to know that they have adopted
quality too early. What about when firms are not investing? If Q is too low,
i.e., below Qˆ
2
, it is not optimal to disclose information since this would not
induce any change in investment strategy. Therefore, it might be optimal to
disclose information only when quality is in that range for which firms might
find it profitable to invest, i.e., when Qˆ
2
≤ Q. Recall that there would be
an early adoption of quality only if θ was in the range for which it delivered
"good news", in the sense that once discovered θ happened to be bigger than
its expected value. On the contrary, it would yield "bad news" if it was
lower than 0. Recall that, without any information, the firm would invest at
Q = Qˆ. Let Q be in the range of Qˆ
2
≤ Q < Qˆ. As Q reaches Qˆ from below,
the set of possible good news, which would induce an early adoption, namely,
those values of θ included in the range 0 < θ < θ(Q), shrinks compared to
the set of bad news. In other words, as Q reaches the investment trigger,
firms are getting closer to the moment in which they would start investing
anyhow. Revealing θ would therefore do only harm to an early adoption of
quality, because the set of possible results of the information disclosure on
the basis of which they would postpone their investment decision becomes
relatively larger than the set of those cases in which they would anticipate
the investments. Obviously, with θ symmetrically distributed, there is just
one value of Q for which those sets are equivalent, that is, when the level of
quality is at Q = Qˆ
2
.
6 Conclusion
We set up a model of collective reputation where firms face two sources of
randomness: one related to the overall level of quality, because of the oc-
currence of random events that affect production, and the other related to
consumers’ subjective beliefs on average quality. We then analyze the role of
information on consumers’ perception on the investment in quality in such a
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setting. First we analyze the firms’ optimal choice of investment in quality
without information on consumers’ valuation of the aggregate level of quality
and determine the option value related to its investment in quality. There are
two opposing effects at work: on the one hand the positive impact on demand
of a reputation for quality gives incentives for investment in quality, on the
other hand free-riding among firms makes a firm wait until going ahead with
its investment. The option value of investment can be negative or positive
depending on which effect prevails. Second, we introduce information acqui-
sition. The firm can obtain information on consumers’ valuation of quality
by paying a fee to a market research company, for example. We identify
the conditions on consumers’ perception of quality that makes information
acquisition increase firms’ investment in quality. Finally, we investigate the
possibility for a firm consortium or public body that is interested in max-
imizing quality adoption, to speed up the quality accumulation process by
acquiring the information on consumers’ perception and revealing it to the
firms. We show that it is never optimal to do so, even if the information
acquisition were costless, since it would have a negative impact on the prob-
ability of an early adoption of quality by the firms. In other words, it is more
likely to do harm to quality adoption in the sense that it would induce firms
to wait more than they would with no information on consumers’ perception.
This result depends in particular on the assumption of a symmetric distribu-
tion of quality perception, as well as on the assumption of a random walk for
the stochastic evolution of quality over time. Far from being ad hoc assump-
tions, we believe that they allow us to develop the model through a neutral
and meaningful set up, which does not introduce any artificial exogenous
bias on the quality perception by consumers, on the one hand, and which
guarantees that quality can be accumulated only by means of deliberate ac-
tion by firms through investment, on the other hand. The latter assumption,
in particular, seems to describe well those situations of collective reputation
building, like the protected geographical labels or the R&D examples that
27
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.44
we referred to in the introduction, for which it seems meaningful to suppose
that there are no systematic windfall gains in the quality building without
any intentional and joint effort undertaken by those who are involved in it.
Our model is only a first attempt at investigating the role of information in
the framework of stochastic collective reputation. Alternative modelization of
quality could also be explored, for example, how firms’ investment decisions
change when their action may reduce the variance of reputation, instead of
the collective reputation itself, as in the present model. We leave such an
extension to a future development.
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A Appendix A
The general solution to the differential equations (6) and (7) takes the form:12
V0(Q; 0) = A0Q
β1 +B0Q
β2 +
a+Q
r
for Q < Qˆ
and
V1(Q; 0) = A1Q
γ1 +B1Q
γ2 +
a
r
+
Q
r − α −
c
r
for Q > Qˆ
12See Dixit and Pindyck (1994, chapters 6 and 7) for a thorough discussion.
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where β1, γ1 > 1 and β2, γ2 < 0 are the roots of the characteristic equations
Q(β) = 1
2
σ2β(β−1)−r = 0 and Q(γ) = 1
2
σ2γ(γ−1)+αγ−r = 0 respectively.
A0, B0, A1, B1 are four constants to be determined. Note that under Q < Qˆ
the first and second terms stand for the value of the option to switch to
investment. However, since the value of the option vanishes as Q → 0, we
set B0 = 0. Similarly, under Q > Qˆ the option to suspend investment is
valueless as Q → ∞ and then we set A1 = 0. To find the constants A0, B1
and the optimal trigger Qˆ we impose a matching value condition and smooth
pasting at Qˆ:
A0Qˆ
β1 +
a+ Qˆ
r
= B1Qˆ
γ2 +
a
r
+
Qˆ
r − α −
c
r
(24)
A0β1Qˆ
β1−1 +
1
r
= B1γ2Qˆ
γ2−1 +
1
r − α (25)
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and the incentive constraint13
A0β1Qˆ
β1 +
Qˆ
r
=
c
α− αn−1
n
(26)
Solving the system [24-26] yields the following:
Qˆ =
(β1 − γ2) rnα − γ2β1
(β1 − γ2)− β1(γ2 − 1) αr−α
c > 0 (27)
and:
Aˆ0 =
[
nc
α
− Qˆ
r
]
Qˆ−β1
β1
Bˆ1 =
[
nc
α
− Qˆ
r − α
]
Qˆ−γ2
γ2
Q.E.D.
13This condition follows from the maximization of Equation (5). Each firm will invest
k = 1 if
1
2
σ2Q2V ′′ + g
1 + n∑
j=2
kj
QV ′ + p(Q; 0)− c ≥ 1
2
σ2Q2V ′′ + g
 n∑
j=2
kj
QV ′ + p(Q; 0)
which at Qˆ , reduces to
g
1 + n∑
j=2
kj
 QˆV ′ − c = g
 n∑
j=2
kj
 QˆV ′
QˆV ′ =
c
g
(
1 +
∑n
j=2 kj
)
− g
(∑n
j=2 kj
)
Then by symmetry we obtain
QˆV ′ = c
g (n)− g (n− 1)
The marginal gain of investing one more unit in quality should be equal to the marginal
cost.
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B Appendix B
For QI below Qˆ, the Bellman equation of (15) is:
rI =
1
2
σ2Q2I ′′ for Q < QI < Qˆ (28)
On the contrary, if the firm acquires the information while investing in quality
the Bellman equation of (15) becomes:
rI =
1
2
σ2Q2I ′′ + αQI ′ for Qˆ < Q < QI (29)
Consider the first case. The general solution for I takes the form:
I(Q) = M0Q
β1 +M1Q
β2 for Q < QI
where β1 > 1 and β2 < 0 are the roots of the characteristic equations Q(β) =
1
2
σ2β(β − 1) − r = 0. However, since the value of the option to acquire the
information vanishes as Q→ 0 we set M1 = 0. To find the constant M0 and
the optimal trigger QI we impose a matching value condition and smooth
pasting at QI . Using (18), we have
M0Q
β1
I =
∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
V0(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ (30)
+
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
V1(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ − V0(QI ; 0)− Φ
n
and:
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M0β1Q
β1−1
I =
dθ˜(QI)
dQI
[
V0(QI ; θ˜(QI))f(θ˜(QI))
]
(31)
+
∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
V ′0(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ
−dθ˜(QI)
dQI
[
V1(QI ; θ˜(QI))f(θ˜(QI))
]
+
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
V ′1(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ − V ′0(QI ; 0)
Since by (13) V0(QI ; θ˜(QI)) = V1(QI ; θ˜(QI)), then (31) reduces to:
M0Q
β1
I =
∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
QI
β1
V ′0(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ
+
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
QI
β1
V ′1(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ −
QI
β1
V ′0(QI ; 0)
Substituting in (30), we get:
∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
V0(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ
+
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
V1(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ − V0(QI ; 0)− Φ
n
=
∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
QI
β1
V ′0(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ
+
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
QI
β1
V ′1(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ −
QI
β1
V ′0(QI ; 0)
Substituting in for V0(QI ; θ) and V1(QI ; θ), and their derivatives gives:
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∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
[
A˜0(θ)Q
β1
I +
a+ (1 + θ)QI
r
]
f(θ)dθ
+
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
[
B˜1(θ)Q
γ2
I +
a
r
+
(1 + θ)QI
r − α −
c
r
]
f(θ)dθ
−
[
Aˆ0Q
β1
I +
a+QI
r
]
− Φ
n
=
∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
QI
β1
[
A˜0(θ)β1Q
β1−1
I +
(1 + θ)
r
]
f(θ)dθ
+
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
QI
β1
[
B˜1(θ)γ2Q
γ2−1
I +
(1 + θ)
r − α
]
f(θ)dθ
−QI
β1
[
Aˆ0β1Q
β1−1
I +
1
r
]
or:
QI
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
(1 + θ)f(θ)dθ
=
β1
β1 − 1
(r − α)
α
[
c
[
1− F (θ˜(QI)
]
+
rΦ
n
]
−β1 − γ2
β1 − 1
(r − α)
α
{∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
rB˜1(θ)Q
γ2
I f(θ)dθ
}
It is easy to show that if Q is below Qˆ
2
it is never optimal for the firm to
acquire information about the true value of θ. This can be seen noting that if
we look for QI ' Qˆ2 , i.e., θ˜(QI) ' +1, the expression above is never satisfied.
Let us turn now to the solution of (29). For this case, the general solution
for I takes the form:
I(Q) = N0Q
γ1 +N1Q
γ2 for Q < QI
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where γ1 > 1 and γ2 < 0 are the roots of the characteristic equations Q(γ) =
1
2
σ2γ(γ − 1) + αγ − r = 0. However, since the value of the option to acquire
the information vanishes as Q → 0 we set N1 = 0, and to find the constant
N0 and the optimal trigger Ql we impose the matching value condition and
smooth pasting at QI . Using (18), we get
N0Q
γ1
I =
∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
V0(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ (32)
+
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
V1(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ − V1(QI ; 0)− Φ
n
and:
N0γ1Q
γ1−1
I =
dθ˜(QI)
dQI
[
V0(QI ; θ˜(QI))f(θ˜(QI))
]
(33)
+
∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
V ′0(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ +
−dθ˜(QI)
dQI
[
V1(QI ; θ˜(QI))f(θ˜(QI))
]
+∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
V ′1(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ − V ′1(QI ; 0)
Since by (13) V0(QI ; θ˜(QI)) = V1(QI ; θ˜(QI)), then (33) simplifies to:
N0Q
γ1
I =
∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
QI
γ1
V ′0(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ
+
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
QI
γ1
V ′1(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ −
QI
γ1
V ′1(QI ; 0)
Substituting in (32), we get:
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∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
V0(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ
+
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
V1(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ − V1(QI ; 0)− Φ
n
=
∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
QI
γ1
V ′0(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ
+
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
QI
γ1
V ′1(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ −
QI
γ1
V ′0(QI ; 0)
Substituting in for V0(QI ; θ) and V1(QI ; θ), and their derivatives:
∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
[
A˜0(θ)Q
β1
I +
a+ (1 + θ)QI
r
]
f(θ)dθ
+
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
[
B˜1(θ)Q
γ2
I +
a
r
+
(1 + θ)QI
r − α −
c
r
]
f(θ)dθ
−
[
Bˆ1Q
γ2
I +
a
r
+
QI
r − α −
c
r
]
− Φ
n
=
∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
QI
γ1
[
A˜0(θ)β1Q
β1−1
I +
(1 + θ)
r
]
f(θ)dθ
+
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
QI
γ1
[
B˜1(θ)γ2Q
γ2−1
I +
(1 + θ)
r − α
]
f(θ)dθ
−QI
γ1
[
Bˆ1γ2Q
γ2−1
I +
1
r − α
]
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or:
QI
[
1−
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
(1 + θ)f(θ)dθ
]
=
(
γ1
γ1 − 1
)
(r − α)
α
[
cF (θ˜(QI)− rΦ
n
]
+
(r − α)
α
(
γ1 − β1
γ1 − 1
)∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
[
rA˜0(θ)Q
β1
I
]
f(θ)dθ
−
(
γ1 − γ2
γ1 − 1
)
(r − α)
α
r
[
Bˆ1Q
γ2
I −
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
B˜1(θ)Q
γ2
I f(θ)dθ
]
If we are looking for an optimal trigger QI  Qˆ, i.e. θ˜(QI) ' −1, the
expression above tends to:
0 =
(
γ1
γ1 − 1
)
Φ
n
which is never satisfied for finite n. Q.E.D.
C Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 4:
Consider first the case when Q ≥ Qˆ. From Equation (23), it is easy to see
that in this case the objective function is always negative:
∆(P (Q)) =
∫ θ˜(Q)
−1
P˜
(
Q˜(θ);Q
)
f(θ)dθ − F (θ˜(Q)) < 0
where P˜
(
Q˜(θ);Q
)
< 1.
Next consider the case when Qˆ
2
≤ Q < Qˆ. Recall that for a generic GBM,
s.t. dx = αxdt+ σxdz, the probability of reaching an upper trigger value x∗
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is given by (Cox and Miller, 1965):
Pr (x∗, x) =

1 if 2α/σ2 ≥ 1(
x∗
x
)(2α/σ2)−1
if 2α/σ2 < 1
(34)
Starting at x in the interior of the range (0, x∗], after a “sufficient” long
interval of time the process is sure to hit the trigger x∗ if the trend is positive
and sufficiently large with respect to the uncertainty. However, if α is positive
but low with respect to the uncertainty or it is negative, the process may drift
away and never hit x∗. Applying the expression in (34) to Equation (23) with
α = 0 we obtain:
∆(P (Q)) =
∫ θ˜(Q)
−1
(
Q
Q˜(θ)
)
f(θ)dθ +
∫ +1
θ˜(Q)
1f(θ)dθ −
(
Q
Qˆ
)
(35)
=
[
1− F (θ˜(Q))
] [
1−
(
Q
Qˆ
)]
+
(
Q
Qˆ
)∫ θ˜(Q)
−1
θf(θ)dθ
We see that ∆(P ( Qˆ
2
)) = 0 and
∆′(P (Q)) =
(
1
Qˆ
)[∫ θ˜(Q)
−1
θf(θ)dθ −
[
1− F (θ˜(Q))
]]
< 0, for all
Qˆ
2
< Q < Qˆ .
Then Q = Qˆ
2
is the single root of Equation 35. Q.E.D.
39
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.44
